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SUMMARY
The mathematical theory of differential games is used to study the
structure of optimal allocation strategies for some time-sequential combat
games with combat described by Lanchester-type equations of warfare. The
work reported here primarily concerns the application of existing differential
game theory (including some recent developments of the author on necessary
conditions of optimality for problems with state variable inequality con-
straints) for the determination of optimal time-sequential combat strategies
in several Lanchester-type differential games of tactical interest. Two
time-sequential problems of optimal fire-support allocation are considered:
the first examines the determination of optimal air-war campaign strategies
within the context of ground-war objectives, while the second examines the
determination of optimal time-sequential fire distribution strategies for
supporting weapon systems (here taken to be artillery or naval ship gunfire)
.
In previous work the author has studied optimal air-war campaign
strategies in a generalization of a well-known tactical air-war differential
game model. This work extended previous work by considering valuation of
surviving air-war assets and temporal variations in both the effectiveness
of counter-air operations and also the return from ground support. The
differential game model discussed above has been criticized, however,
because it does not evaluate air-war tactics within the context of ground-
war objectives. Consequently, this model produces suboptimization. Hence,
a model is considered which is considerably broader in scope, does consider
land-war objectives, but (unfortunately) is considerably less susceptible
to closed-form analytic solution. For this new model partial results
concerning the determination of optimal campaign strategies are obtained
and contrasted with those for the model previously discussed above.
i
The determination of optimal fire distribution strategies for
supporting weapon systems is a major problem of military operations research,
The author has studied some aspects of this problem in previous research.
Motivated by a paper which recently appeared in the open literature, optimal
fire-support strategies are studied in an attack scenario. The dependence
of optimal fire-support strategies on combatant objectives is examined for
a problem previously considered in the open literature: necessary and
sufficient conditions on the functional form of the criterion functional
(terminal payoff only) for the optimal fire-support strategies to be inde-
pendent of force levels (at least for a certain range of values) are
developed. This shows that certain results previously reported in the
literature are, in general, not true. A variation of this problem is then
considered. In contrast to the previous work reported in the literature,
the attrition structure of the problem at hand leads to the optimal fire-
support strategy of the attacker requiring him to sometimes split his
artillery fire between enemy infantry and artillery (counterbattery fire).
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C. Optimal Air-War Strategies Within the Context of Land-War Objectives
D. Some Differential Game Models for the Study of Optimal Fire-Support
Strategies
i*NOTE: Appendices A, B, and E were published earlier in [10] .
See list of references at end of main body of this report.

1. Introduction .
This report is the fourth in a series of reports which document the
author's research on the structure of optimal (time-sequential) allocation
policies for tactical situations described by Lanchester-type equations of
warfare. The report at hand contains Appendices C and D of the author's
previous report [10]. The results of these appendices were discussed in
general terms in [10] , but it had not been possible to publish the appendices
themselves at that time. For the reader's convenience, portions of the main
body of the report [10] are reproduced here as they pertain to the
work at hand. It should be understood that in Appendices C and D of the
report at hand when reference is made to Appendices A, B, and E, it refers
to work previously published in IlO] .
By considering several combat scenarios, further insights have been
gained into such important questions as:
(1) How should fire be distributed over targets?
(2) How should targets be selected?
(3) Do target priorities change over time?
(4) Do force levels affect the optimal allocation strategies?
(5) How does the number of target types affect the optimal
allocation strategies?
(6) Do conflict termination circumstances affect the optimal
allocation strategies?
(7) How are the optimal fire distribution/target selection
strategies affected by the nature of the attrition
processes?
(8) What is the effect of logistics constraints on such
policies?
(9) How does the uncertainty and confusion of combat affect
optimal allocation strategies?
Specific objectives of this research have been the identification of decision
parameters and the further development of general principles for target
selection, regulation of firing rate, and allocation of military resources
in dynamic combat situations. A further discussion of research objectives
and their relationship to defense planning problems can be found in the
author's past reports* [8], [9], [10]. It should be pointed out that al-
though the quantitative analysis of tactics may be considered to be a
relatively new field of military operations research, there is wide-spread
interest in such work (see [4], [6], [7], [8], [15]).
Our approach has been to combine Lanchester-type models of warfare
with generalized control theory (both deterministic and stochastic optimal
control, dynamic programming, and differential games) [9], [13] (see also
[14]). This has been done by considering a sequence of concrete situations
for which optimization problems were formulated and solved by application of
the mathematical theory of differential games. The structure of optimal
time-sequential fire allocation strategies has been studied by considering
the solutions for specific problems and comparing and contrasting these.
The organization of this report is to discuss results in general
terms in the main body and to leave details for the appendices.
2. Guided Tour of the Appendices .
In this section we summarize the work which is contained in the
appendices and explain why this work was done. The results reported here
*
A comprehensive review of pertinent literature prior to 1973 in the fields
of (a) Lanchester-type models of warfare, (b) differential games, and (c)
optimal control of Lanchester-type attrition processes is also to be found
in 19].
may be considered to be extensions of our earlier work [8], [9], [10], [13].
Moreover, the work at hand lays the foundations for more extensive work on
the quantitative analysis of tactics and applications of generalized control
theory to problems of military operations research.
As mentioned above, Appendices A, B, and E have been published
separately in [10]. The report at hand contains only Appendices C and D.
In Appendices B and C we apply the theoretical results of Appendix
A to the study of optimal air-war strategies. This has been over the years
a problem of lasting interest for defense planners. In Appendix B we consider
a generalization of the tactical air-war game of A. Mengel [2] (see also
[1]) in which aircraft effectiveness may vary over time and a residual value
for aircraft at the end of the campaign is considered. Optimal strategies
are characterized for this general problem. A complete solution (i.e.
,
explicit determination of optimal closed-loop strategies) is given for cases
of constant coefficients. These results are much more general than previous
ones and provide much insight into trade-offs between various planning
parameters. Preliminary results are also obtained for problems in which
aircraft effectiveness in the air war is constant but the value of ground
support changes over time. The latter is an attempt to reflect the influence
of combat air support on the ground war and hence avoid suboptimization. Two
cases of time-dependent "returns" from ground support are considered:
(a) linearly-decreasing-with-time returns from ground support,
(b) exponentially-decreasing^with-time returns from ground
support.
One criticism that has been made of the model considered in Appendix
B is that it does not evaluate air-war strategies within the context of
ground-war objectives. In other words, this model (unfortunately) produces
suboptimization. Thus, in Appendix C we present preliminary results for a
model which considers the development of optimal air-war strategies within
the context of land-war objectives. These preliminary results show that
the outcome of the ground war may be a significant factor in the deter-
mination of optimal air-war strategies.
The research reported in Appendices B and C was undertaken because
an important question for defense planners is what are appropriate missions
over the course of a campaign for tactical air power. The answer to this
question has far-reaching implications for Navy air forces (both carrier-
based and land-based) and, of course, the Air Force. Recently, the USAF
Studies and Analysis Group has been using quantitative methodology [15] in
trying to answer such questions. By considering the results given in
Appendices B and C one can begin to see the effects of the nature of the
combat optimization problem on the structure of optimal air-war strategies.
The determination of optimal fire distribution strategies for
supporting weapon systems is a major problem of military operations research.
This problem is particularly of interest to the military tactician so that
he may have a clearer understanding of the circumstances, for example, under
which enemy infantry should be engaged by a supporting weapon system (such
as artillery) and those under which "counter-battery" fire is to be preferred.
Furthermore, the study of such tactical time-sequential allocation problems
is relevant to the Navy mission of fire support (both by ship gunfire and
by carrier-based air)
.
In Appendix D we further consider the determination of optimal fire
distribution strategies for supporting weapon systems. In this case it is
appropriate to call the supporting weapon system artillery. We consider
extensions of some recent work by Kawara [3] concerning optimal strategies
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for supporting weapon systems in an attack scenario which is a variation of
a model considered by Weiss [16]. We first examine for what class of
criterion functionals (terminal payoff only) the optimal fire-support
strategies are independent of the force levels and then examine the depend-
ence of the optimal fire-support strategies upon the form of the combat
attrition model by considering slightly different combat dynamics than
those considered by Kawara [3]: we assume that the attacker's artillery
produces "linear-law" attrition (see [11], [14]) against both the defender's
artillery as well as infantry. The development of a complete solution to
the latter problem has involved solution phenomena not previously encoun-
tered in a Lanchester-type differential game: the dual variables are
discontinuous across a manifold of discontinuity of both players' strategies.
The research reported in Appendix D was undertaken to obtain a better
understanding of the dependence of the structure of optimal fire-support
strategies upon model form. Previous work by Weiss [16] (see also [2])
and Kawara [3] had given the impression that an optimal fire-support strategy
consists in always concentrating all fire on one enemy target type. From
our previous work [11] on a one-sided Lanchester-type, time-sequential fire
distribution problem in which each of two enemy target types undergoes a
"linear-law" attrition process, we knew that an optimal fire distribution
policy could consist in splitting one's fire between available target types.
This was our motivation for the examination of other attrition structures
in Kawara' s problem. Additionally, Kawara' s recent work [3] stimulated our
research on the influence of combatant objectives on optimal fire-support
strategies because of Kawara' s remarkable result that (at least within a
certain range of force levels) optimal fire-support strategies do not depend
on force levels. We were able to show that Kawara had used the only type of
5
objective function that yields this result. Thus, in general, the result
is not true.
3. Summary of Research Findings (same as in [10]) .
Here we summarize our research results. We have (at least partially)
accomplished the following tasks which were suggested for future research
in our previous report [9]: (a), (b2) , (e) , (g) , (il) , (j2), and (k) .
Results are organized under the following headings
:
(1) solution methodology for time-sequential combat games,
(2) insights gained into the optimization of combat dynamics,
(3) implications for defense planning.
Items (2) and (3) differ in that the latter is a management-oriented digest
of the practical implications of our research, whereas the former is oriented
towards a technical audience. Further amplification of results and conclusions
is to be found in the appendices.
a. Solution Methodology for Time-Sequential Combat Games .
Our research has produced the following results on solution methodology
for time-sequential combat games. Specifically, we have accomplished the
following:
(1) developed theory of state variable inequality constraints
for LanChester-type differential games (This theory is
essential for all problems with, for example, negativity
restrictions on force levels)
,
(2) demonstrated use of theory of state variable inequality
constraints for solving time-sequential combat games by
developing solutions to several specific combat optimiza-
tion problems,
(3) developed complete solution to a fire support differential
game. This involved the following technical difficulties:
(a) singular surfaces,
(b) discontinuity in the dual variables,
(4) developed methodology for determining the functional form
of the criterion functional (terminal payoff here) which
yields optimal strategies that do not depend on force
levels (at least for a certain range of force levels)
,
(5) concluded that computational methods must give consideration
to structural properties of optimal strategies in idealized
versions like those considered in this report.
b. Insights Gained into the Optimization of Combat Dynamics .
Based on our study of the optimization of combat dynamics using the
mathematical theory of differential games, we have reached the following
conclusions:
(1) the structure of optimal strategies depends on the
following factors:
(a) criterion functional,
(b) combat attrition model,
(c) battle termination model;
the dependence is complex, and future research should
concentrate upon the examination of numerous structures
of tactical interest,
(2) optimal fire-support strategies depend on the nature of
the attrition process produced by the supporting weapon
system; when the supporting weapon system produces casu-
alties at a rate proportional to the product of the numbers
of firers and targets of a particular type (see Appendix D
for mathematical formulation) , the optimal fire-support
strategy of the supporting weapon system has the following
characteristics
:
(a) it depends on the optimal strategy for the
enemy's supporting weapon system,
(b) the optimal distribution of supporting
fires may be
(i) to concentrate on enemy
infantry,
(ii) to split fire to avoid
overkilling,
(ill) to concentrate on enemy
artillery,
(c) counterbattery fire is the optimal strategy
during the early stages of an attack and
destruction of enemy infantry is the optimal
strategy during the final moments (unless the
ratio of defender infantry to defender
artillery is "extremely" large, in which
case the infantry is always engaged)
,
(d) a split of supporting fires between enemy
infantry and artillery as an optimal
strategy can only occur when enemy infantry
have some effectiveness against friendly
infantry,
(3) optimal air-war strategies are different for the case in
which ground-war objectives are considered than for that in
which they are not
,
(A) optimal air-war strategies (see Appendix B for scenario)
depend on the following factors
:
(a) residual value of surviving aircraft,
(b) force levels (especially when a side is
going to lose the fight for air supremacy:
faced with a future loss of air power, one
may abandon the fight for air supremacy
and get what ground support one can from
his planes before he loses them all)
(5) cases with variations over time in weapon system ef-
fectiveness are best studied as extensions of constant
coefficient cases.
c. Implications for Defense Planning .
In our research reported here we have studied idealizations of
allocation structures that commonly occur in defense planning studies.
After studying these idealizations in order to gain insight into the
structure of optimal strategies in the complex real-world problem, we have
reached the following conclusions as to considerations that should be
brought to the attention of defense planners. These results should be
kept in mind by practitioners who perform more detailed computer simulation
studies.
(1) The combat optimization problem should be thought of as
consisting of three parts:
(i) combatant objectives,
(ii) conflict termination conditions,
(iii) combat dynamics.
Optimal combat strategies depend on all three of the
above. More basic scientific research should be done
on all three, especially the first two.
(2) Force levels do affect (either directly or indirectly)
optimal combat strategies.
(3) It may be quite dangerous to generalize optimal combat
strategies developed for specific problems. At present,
more research is needed on specific problems in order to
develop an understanding of the qualifications that may
be necessary to make about specific study results.
(4) Optimal air-war strategies must be based on ground-war
objectives. Suboptimization results when this is not
done. This suboptimization is a serious problem, since
it may lead to winning the air campaign but losing the
war.
4. Suggested Future Research Tasks .
After performing the research documented in this report , we feel that
the current state-of-the-art for applying the theory of differential games
to time-sequential combat games is such that more significant results may
be readily obtained in the future. Moreover, this previous research pro-
vides valuable perspective for identifying what appear to be the most
important research tasks to be considered next. In our opinion the most
important task is to examine (and then understand) the influence of objec-
tives on optimal strategies. Another important task is to study the
structure of optimal fire-support strategies.
Based on our past research experience we feel that there is much to
be accomplished in the future. Specifically, we suggest the following as
future research tasks:
(a) Examination of the effects of campaign objectives (as
reflected by the criterion functional) on the structure
of optimal campaign strategies. In all our past research
we have with one exception always considered a linear
utility for survivors in the criterion functional. It is
of interest to examine how the valuation of survivors
affects the structure of optimal strategies. Other
criterion functionals that might be considered are
(1) nonlinear valuation of survivors
(either the difference or ratio of
functions which are, for example,
concave, quasi-concave, etc.).
(2) the value of losses rather than
survivors.
It would seem appropriate to begin such an investigation
by considering the simplest problem possible.
(b) Further general study of optimal fire-support strategies.
The actual military operations must be analyzed and
decisions identified. For various cases, the appropriate
scenario and, consequently, Lanchester-type model would
be developed, and the optimization problem studied. It
is felt that at this time it is most important to study
various specific problems in order to gain insight into
the structure of optimal fire-support strategies.
(c) Further study of optimal fire-support strategies for the
model given by equations (64) of Appendix D. Some
further analytic work remains to be done on the fire-
support differential game model considered in Appendix
D. It remains to consider the effect of annihilation
of fire-support resources upon optimal time-sequential
fire distribution strategies. Additionally, further
computational work on this problem would be worthwhile.
(d) Further study the determination of optimal air-war
strategies within the context of land-war objectives.
Based on preliminary results given in this report, it
appears as though the outcome of the ground war is a
significant factor* in the determination of optimal
air-war strategies and that optimal strategies devel-
oped for a model not considering land-war objectives
need not be optimal for a model which does consider
them. This proposed research would extend the results
given in Appendix C of the report at hand.
A more comprehensive (although somewhat dated now) discussion of
suggested future research tasks can also be found on pages 65-67 of our pre-
vious report [9] (see also pp. 10-11 of [10]). Work still remains to be done








(h) , and (j).
*
This is not considered, for example, in TAC CONTENDER [15].
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APPENDIX C: Optimal Air-War Strategies Within the Context of Land-War
Objectives
I. Introduction.
As discussed in Appendix B, an important problem of military operations
analysis is the determination of optimal air-war strategies. This problem is
not only of intrinsic importance but also its solution has applications to
force mix/force structuring analyses. It is a topic of current interest
[8] and has been for over thirty years.
In Appendix B we considered a differential game model for the determin-
ation of optimal strategies for the employment of a supporting weapon system
(here tactical air power) which we called the tactical air-war game . The
constant coefficient version of this model may be stated as
maximize minimize {v x(t_) - v y(t-) +
U V
X t Y r
(Bux-Avy)dt),











with initial conditions x(t=0) = x and y(t=0) = y„
x,y > (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
< u,v < 1 (Strategic Variable Inequality Constraints),
x(t) and y(t) are the numbers of X and Y aircraft,
respectively, at time t,
a and b are constant (Lanchester) attrition-rate coefficients,
C-2
r and s are replacement rates,
v (v ) is the value of one surviving X(Y) aircraft,
X i
A(B) is the (constant) value of one Y(X) aircraft flying
ground support for a unit of time,
u(v) is the fraction of total X(Y) aircraft which fly ground
support missions.
A further discussion of the formulation of this model is to be found in






Figure 1. Diagram of Tactical Air-War Game.
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We have discussed that a shortcoming of (1) is that it does not evaluate
air-war tactics within the context of ground-war objectives. This is because
the objective functional (or any minor variation of it) does not directly
reflect the outcome of the land war. This model suboptimizes . Assumptions
have been made which result in a very mathematically tractable optimization
problem, but one which, unfortunately, does not consider the entire system
and its objectives. We will now consider a (still idealized) model which is
considerably broader in scope, does consider land-war objectives, but (unfor-
tunately) is considerably less susceptible to closed-form analytic solution.
We will only present a few preliminary results with further study left as
future work.
Let us consider a war between X and Y forces, each of which is
composed of both ground forces (called infantry) and air forces. The ground
forces are engaged in combat, while each side has to decide the optimal use
of its air forces, i.e. how to optimally allocate these resources between ground-
support missions and counter-air missions (see Appendix B for a further discus-
sion) . For the purposes of our analysis here, let us assume that each side
wants to maximize the net worth of survivors at the end of a war which ter-
k*
minates (for the sake of convenience) with the annihilation of one side s
or the other's ground forces. Mathematically, the problem may be stated as
the following.
*
Further considerations for the determination of decision criteria are discussed
in [3] and [4].
More "realistic" battle termination conditions along with associated analytic
difficulties are discussed in [7].
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2 2
maximize minimize { £ v x (T) - £ v y (T) } with T unspecified,
U V k=l \ k=l k "
with stopping rule: (a) x (T) = 0,
or
(b) Y] (T) = 0,
dx..
subject to: -r—• - -a,,y, - va y , (2)


















ir = S 2 - d-^^v
with initial conditions
x.(t=0) = x° and y. (t=0) = y° for i = 1,2
and
x ,x ,y ,y ^0 (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
5. u,v ^ 1 (Strategic Variable Inequality Contsraints)
,
where
x (t) is the number of X infantry (i.e. X..) at time t,
x_(t) is the number of X aircraft (i.e. X
9 )
at time t,
similarly for y (t) and y (t),
a.. is a constant (Lanchester) attrition-rate coefficient (the




u(v) is the fraction of total X (Y ) forces (i.e. aricraft) which
fly ground support missions,
and other symbols are used in a similar fashion as those for probJem (1).
This situation is shown diagrammatically in Figure 2.
C-5
Air Air
Figure 2. Model for Determination of Optimal Air-War Strategies
Within Context of Ground-War Objectives.
In the above model (2), the objective of each side is to "win" the
ground war as "efficiently" as possible. We see that this model then evalu-
ates air-war tactics within the context of ground-war objectives. We will
develop some preliminary results for the determination of optimal strategies
for (2). Unfortunately, it is a very hard problem, and its final resolution
may require making some simplifying assumptions or using computational methods
C-6
Of particular importance is to compare optimal strategies for (1) with those
of (2) to determine the effects of suboptimization. It is of great interest
to determine the adequacy of air-war strategies which have been developed
in a model like (1) by evaluating them in a model like (2) . For reasons of
such a comparison, we have included replacements of both sides' aircraft in
(2). It should finally be pointed out that our multiplier conditions for
differential games with state variable inequality constraints play a signifi-
cant role in the developments of this appendix.
2 . Development of Basic Necessary Conditions of Optimality .
It should be clear that we have in (2) above that v ,v ^ for
1 X
i = 1,2 and that r ,s-,a ,a ,a
2
_,b. ,b „,b > 0. It may be shown using
the results of Friedman that the differential game (2) has value (see pp. 210-
230 of [2]) and that a saddle point exists in pure strategies (see pp. 234-235
of [2]). We now will develop necessary conditions of optimality for (2).
Applying the results of Appendix A, we have that the Hamiltonian is
given by






) + P2^ r 2~ <' 1~V ')a 22y 2*
+ q
1















- for x >
:> for x = 0,
for y 2
> 0,
£ for y = 0,
7Because of the stopping rule we need not consider the state variable inequality
constraints (SVIC's) x ,y > 0. We have adopted above the following corre-
spondence between state and adjoint variables:
state variable dual variable
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Th e adjoint system of differential equations for the dua l variables is
dPl 3R
, ^dT = " 3x7 '" ilV
dp
2 3H
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The boundary conditions at t = T for the adjoint variables will be discussed
below.
When x 9 »y 9 > 0) the extremal strategic-variable pair, denoted as
(u*,v*), is determined by the max-min principle . Hence, we consider
maximize minimize H(t ,x, £,£,0^,11=0 ,n = ,u,v) , (10)
0s>u£>l O^v^l
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Thus, for y > 0, we have





















It may be shown that there are no u-singular subarcs in the solution of (2).
We also have for x„ >
!1
for a p (t) > a p 2 (t),
(14)




It may be shown that no v-slngular subarcs exist.

































Since we must have ^> v* ^ 1 and -—(t ) < (here t ' denotes a left-dt e e
















because r < a y (t ). Since x„(t) = for t " ^ t £ t. , the dimension
e. i.L £. e Z e x.
of the state space may be thought of as being reduced by one, and hence the
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The multiplier u(t) is determined by























2for t " < t < t„ ,
e I
(18)
Thus, the necessary condition of optimality u(t) ^ leads to that on a con-
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When y > and x (t) = for t " si t s. t£ , we have that v*(t) is
dx
determined by the condition that -:— =0. It should be noted that (17)
implies that (12) is identically satisfied. In this case only u* is to be
determined by the max-min principle (10). However, when x.(t) = 0, then
the max-min principle (or, equivalently
, (11)) no longer yields that we must
have u*(t) given by (13). However, we may still take (13) to hold by a con-
tinuity argument in which we consider x ? (t) = e > and then let e -> .
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It remains to discuss the corner conditions which must hold at entrances





of time. At entrance to constrained subarc with x (t) = for t s> t ^ t
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where H(t 2 ) denotes H(t 2 ,x.. (t 2 ) ,x„ (t
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y=0,n=0,u*(t ),v*(t ) = 1). It is readily seen that
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since we must have r < a 9y.(t ). We thus see that the corner conditions
(21) are automatically satisfied when (15) through (19) hold, and thus they
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Again, we see that the corner conditions (23) are automatically satisfied when
(15) through (19) hold, and thus they yield no new information.
2.2. Necessary Conditions of Optimality on Constrained Subarc for y .
Similar analysis yields for a constrained subarc on which y 9 (t) =
Y Y
2 2for t s; t s t„ that we must have
e a
s Y Y
u* (t) = *
"W^ £or ^2<t< t%2, (25>
2 2
with s_ < b-_x
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The corner conditions yield that at entry to constrained subarc on
2 2
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e
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Also, the corne r conditions yield that at exit from constrained subarc on
Y Y
2 2








































Thus, the corner conditions yield no useful information that we did not
already know.
2.3. Boundary Conditions for Adjoint Variables .




(2) Yl (T) = 0.
Case ( 1): x (T) = .
In this case we use the function 4> defined by (4) in the transver-
sality conditions. It should also be clear that we must have y (t=T) > 0.
C-14
The boundary conditions at t = T for the adjoint variables are then
Pl (t=T) = vXi+
o
1
where a is an unrestricted multiplier, (32)
P
2
(t=T) - v^ - v
x
= for x (T) > 0,
where v, < (33)
•A £ for x (T) = 0,















We may also write (32) as
P 1
(t=T) = a where a is an unrestricted multiplier. (36)
3*.
We determine a from the transversality condition H(T) + -r^— =0, or
H(T,xjT),yjT),pjT),qjT),y,n,u*(T),v*(T)) = 0, (37)
Using (3), we then have
(-a){a




























If the system is on a constrained subarc with x (t) = for t " si t SJ T
x
2
with t < T, then it is clear that we must have y ? (T) > so that ^ = 0.
Thus, the boundary conditions (33) through (36) for the adjoint variables take
the form
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Since we have been on a constrained subarc with x (t) = for a finite
interval of time, Y must be using the control (15) with r < a y (t)
X
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so that by (43) we have a < 0. It should be noted that (46) is automatically
satisfied with v > 0. We also have
12




Thus, we have proved
THEOREM 1: If the system is on a constrained subarc with x_(t) :
X X












(b) a < given by (47)
.
3W
Recalling that a = p^T) =
^ (T)
where W = W(t ,x- ,x ,y ,y ) denotes
Bellman's optimal value function [1], we see that there is a negative marginal
return to X for having more infantry. This is understandable, since if he
did have more X.. forces (but still lost the ground war)
,
the war would be
prolonged to the advantage of Y who has complete air superiority.
Y
2
If the system is on a constrained subarc with y 9 (t) = for t ^
Y
t *» T with t < T, then it is clear that we must have x (T) > so
that v.. = 0. Thus, the boundary conditions (33) through (36) for the adjoint
variables take the form
p 1 (t=T) = a where a is an unrestricted multiplier, (49)
P 2
(t=T) = v^,













Since we have been on a constrained subarc with y„(t) = for a finite
interval of time, X must be using the control (25), and, in particular,
at t = T we have



















































where we must have s~ < b x (T) so that a > 0. Thus, we have proved
THEOREM 2: If the system is on a constrained subarc with y 9 (t)
Y Y


























This case is similar to the previous one only with the roles of X
and Y interchanged.
3. Introduction of the Switching Functions S (t) and S (t) .













Then, we may re-write the extremal control law (13) for the strategic variable
u ( t ) as
for y 2
>




* for S (t) < 0,
and it follows from (57) and the adjoint equations that
for y > 0:




















-- = when y = for a finite interval of time. (60)
at l










Then, we may re-write the extremal control law (14) for the strategic
variable v(t) as
for x > 0:
{1
for S (t) > 0,
(62)
for S (t) < 0,
and it follows from (61) and the adjoint equations that
























= when x_ = for a finite interval of time. (64)
at z
4 . Synthesis of Extremal Strategic-Variable Pair .
In this section we will partially synthesize the extremal strategies
in one of four cases. We hope to study this important problem more thoroughly










































(A) The quantity b a „ may be considered as the rate of destruction
by X
?
of Y's kill capability against X (see also [5], [7]).
(B) The quantity b _a may be considered as the rate of destruction
by X
?









Let us first make some observations before we give a few preliminary
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--(t) > for y_ > and p. (t) >
at z L
(65)
In a similar fashion it may be shown that
dS
—
-(t) > for x > and q (t) < 0. (66)
Since we will synthesize extremals to (2) by working backwards from the end
at t = T, it is convenient to introduce the backwards time T defined by
t = T - t.
dS dS
It readily follows that -j— = - -— . Thus, we may re-state the above




PROPOSITION 2: If x > and q. (t) < 0, then ~
2 Hl v ' dx
<
Also, let us make some observations about the satisfaction of necessary
conditions of optimality for a constrained subarc on which x~(t) = for
X« X_ X_ X_
t £ t'£ t with t < t. . Our assumption that a b > a ~b implies
that for q
x














then it follows that a
2 2
b 22^~ q 2^ ^ a22














)) > a i2
b
ll^~ q l^'
Thus, we have proven
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PROPOSITION 3: If q 1




necessary condition of optimality (20) for being
on a constrained subarc with x_(t) = for
X X X X
t st it. with t < t„ is satisfied,
e I e £
The significance of the above proposition is that it guarantees that (local)
necessary conditions of optimality are automatically satisfied whenever the
system is steered to x„ = and maintained that way for a finite interval
of time. Similarly, we can prove




necessary condition of optimality (29) for being
on a constrained subarc with y~(t) = for
Y . Y Y Y
2 2 2 2
t £ t £ t
n
with t ' < t„ is satisfied,
e Jc ex,
Considering the above results it seems appropriate to examine under
what conditions P-, (t) < and q, (t) > 0. From an integration of the adjoint






























Thus, we can state the following self-evident propositions
PROPOSITION 5: If p,(t=T) > and q
;












If p (t=T) ^0 and q-U-T) < (or,






for all t £ [0,T).
Let us now consider the case in which Y wins , i.e. x.. (T) = 0.






In Subcase (a): y 9 (T) > , the boundary conditions (33) through (36)
for the adjoint variables become
P
x




p (t=T) = v - v where v \Z A
2
X













Let us further assume that a 10vv > a oovv an<^ that b v > b v . If
x (T) > 0, then the assumption that b v > b v , (57), (72), and (73)
yield that S (t=0) > so that by (58) we have u*(t=0) = 1. The trans-



















If we consider the case in which a p (t=T) ^ a 0Ovv where p (t=T) is
given by (74), then S (t=0) £ with q (t=T) < implies that S (t) <
for < x < x , since then q, (x) < for s x < x so that by Proposi-
dS
V Q
tion 2 -j-^(x) < for ^ x < x < t . Also, if p (t=T) £ 0, then by
Proposition 6 we have p,(t) > and q (t) < for all t C [0,T). Then
Proposition 2 yields that S (x) < for < x £> T, since S (x=0) ^
dS
V V
and -t~^(t) < for s x £ T. Thus, if & a p (t=T) £ a v , then
O.T J.A
_L Z. Z. X_
v*(t) = for £ t ^ T. Furthermore, since p (t) > 0, we have S (x=0)
dS 1 u
> with -
— (x) < for all x ^ 0. Hence, the equation S (x=x 1 ) =
ax u 1
has a solution, and there is a switch in X's extremal strategy at x = x
in backwards time. To summarize, we have shown that for
x (t-T) = 0, x
2
(t=T) > 0, yi (t=T)
> 0, y 2
(t=T) > 0,
and




















for £> x ^ t,
1
for x < x ^ T.
Unfortunately, much more work remains to be done.
In Subcase (b); y 9 (T) = , let us briefly consider the further subcase
Y Y
2 2















P] (t=T) = a > 0, (77)
s Y
U* (T) = 1 .__ for 0ST<T
e
. (78)
By (31) and (5 7), we have
Y
2
S (t=t Z ) = 0. (79)
u e
Now (77) and q (t=T) = -vy < imply by Proposition 5 that p (t) >
1
and q, (t) < for all t £ [0,T]. We then have by Proposition 1 that
dS
T^CO < for all x € [0,T]. (80)
The conditions (79) and (80) yield that
S (x) < for all x € (t
Y
,T], (81)
so that by (58) we have
Y
2
u*(t) = for all t k (t ,T].
e
It should be noted that by Proposition 4 the necessary condition (29) is
satisfied on the constrained subarc. Thus, we see that this subcase can only
arise when (76) holds and then
Y
2
,0 for * t.* T - t
,
U* (0 =





Again, we must terminate our discussion with this preliminary result.
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5 . Discussion .
In this appendix we have applied the theory of differential games
(including the theory of state variable inequality constraints (SVIC's)
developed in Appendix A) to the study of optimal air-war strategies in a
model which considers ground-war objectives. Our reasons for doing this have
been explained in the introduction to this appendix. The results presented
in this appendix are preliminary, being based on an initial examination. We
feel that this is an important and promising area and propose such further
work to ONR as a future research task. The complete determination of optimal
strategies for (2) will be an involved task and must follow the solution
methodology given in [6].
It should be pointed out that the model (2) may be thought of as a
generalization of the supporting weapon system game of H. K. Weiss [9] (see


















= \ = l > and VX2 = % = °'
It should be noted that this corresponds to Case (II) above. Thus, study of
the model (2) with r = s ? = and a = b = is itself of considerable
intrinsic interest, since it generalizes the results of Weiss [9] (see also
[6]). It should be pointed out that the theory of SVIC's has never been used
before to study such a problem.
From our preliminary results (which have been a characterization of an
optimal strategy but not the actual determination of one)
,
it appears as
though the outcome of the ground war is a significant factor in the determina-
tion of optimal air-war strategies and that optimal strategies developed for
the model (1) need not be optimal for the model (2). It would be of great
interest to numerically compare the payoff to, for example, X from using an
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optimal strategy for the model (1) in (2) with that from using the optimal
strategy for (2). The sensitivity of the payoff to X's strategy is of
particular importance. Thus, we propose to ONR to further study the model
(2) and to compare results with (1)
.
Our initial investigation here has produced an insight of particular
importance for force-level planning. By Theorem 1 we see that increasing
the X force level (or the X» force level) late in the war may actually
decrease the payoff to X (even if he follows an optimal strategy) if the
system still reaches the end state of x
1
(t=T) = and x 9 (t-T) = 0, since
the war is prolonged in a losing cause to the profit of Y. Such phenomena
should be examined more thoroughly in the future. This may be the most
significant insight developed from our research. Intuitively, as was possibly
the case in the war in Vietnam, if a side commits resources that are not
sufficient to produce a favorable outcome in a time-sequential combat game
but only enough to prolong the occurrence of an unfavorable outcome, then
there may be negative marginal return from the resources, and it is foolish
to use them accordingly.
C-27
REFERENCES
[1] R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming , Princeton University Press, Princeton
(1957).
[2] A. Freidman, Differential Games , Wiley- Interscience, New York (1971).
[3] G. Pugh and J. Mayberry, "Analysis of General-Purpose Force Procurement,"
Lambda Corporation, Paper 59, August 1971.
[4] G. Pugh and J. Mayberry, "Theory of Measures of Effectiveness for
General-Purpose Military Forces: Part I. A Zero-Sum Payoff Appropriate
for Evaluating Combat Strategies," Opns. Res. 21 , 867-885 (1973).
[5] J. Taylor, "Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare and Optimal Control,"
Naval Res. Log. Quart. 21
,
79-106 (1974).
[6] J. Taylor, "Some Differential Games of Tactical Interest," Opns. Res. 22 ,
304-317 (1974).
[7] J. Taylor, "Survey on the Optimal Control of Lanchester-Type Attrition
Processes," to appear in Proceedings of the Workshop on the State-of-
the-Art of Mathematics in Combat Models .
[8] USAF Assistant Chief of Staff, Studies and Analysis, "Methodology for
Use in Measuring the Effectiveness of General Purpose Forces, SABER
GRAND (ALPHA)," March 1971.
[91 H. Weiss, "Some Differential Games of Tactical Interest and the Value
of a Supporting Weapon System," Opns. Res. 7 , 180-196 (1959).

APPENDIX D: Some Differential Game Models for the Study of Optimal Fire-
Support Strategies.
1. Introduction .
The determination of optimal fire distribution strategies for supporting
weapon systems is a major problem of military operations research. This
problem in one form or another is probably one of the most extensively studied
problems in both the open literature and also classified sources, although
this observation apparently has not been made previously. The problem is of
interest to the military tactician so that he may have a clearer understanding
of the circumstances under which enemy infantry should be engaged by a support-
ing weapon system (such as artillery) and those under which "counter-battery"
fire is to be preferred. Furthermore, the study of this tactical allocation
problem is relevant to the Navy mission of fire support (both by ship gunfire
and by carrier-based air) . Related optimization problems (in which the support-
ing weapon system is called "air") have been considered in the previous
appendices.
As we have noted before, Berkovitz and Dresher [3] make the point with
which we agree that operational gaming is not a helpful device for solving
a game or getting significant information about the solution." One must dis-
tinguish between finding out how people make decisions and how they should.
Most analysts agree that operational gaming is not a useful tool for answering
the latter question. As Weiss has also emphasized [32], a model of an idealized
combat situation is particularly valuable when it leads to a clearer understand-
ing of significant relationships which would tend to be obscured in a more
See [32] for a brief discussion of the distinction between a "primary" weapon
system (or infantry) and a "supporting" weapon system.
See [21] or [29] for a discussion of terminology and background.
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complex (and "realistic") model. It is in this spirit that most of the work
reviewed below has been done and in which we consider several simplified
models for gaining insight into optimal fire support strategies.
It seems appropriate to briefly sketch some of the work previously done
on such problems and how our work here is related to this. The problem of
the appropriate mixture of tactical and strategic forces (another aspect of
the optimal fire support strategy problem) was extensively debated by experts
during World War II. Some analysis details may be found in the classical
book by Morse and Kimball (see pp. 73-77 of [20]). The problem was studied
at RAND in the late 1940' s and early 1950's (see [12]) and elsewhere (see [1]).
It would probably not be too far-fetched to claim that this problem stimulated
early research on both dynamic programming (see [2]) and also differential
games (see [12], [14]). Today the problem of optimal air-war strategies is
being extensively studied by a number of organizations (see, for example, [19],
[23], [30]).
In Appendix B we have considered a differential game model closely
related to A. Mengel's "War of Attrition and Attack" (see pp. 96-105 of Isaacs'
book [15]). Discrete-time versions of this problem for the determination of
optimal "air-war" strategies (see also [12]) have been considered by a number
of workers as time-sequential combat games [3], [4], [11] (see also [5], [8]).
Another related problem was considered by Weiss [32], who studied the optimal
selection of targets for engagement by a supporting weapon system. Recently,
Kawara [16] has studied optimal strategies for supporting weapon systems in
an attack scenario which is a variation of the model considered by Weiss [32].
See [28], however, for a justification of the optimality of strategies determined
by Weiss [32]. A general solution algorithm is also presented in this paper [28],
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Other recent work has considered various conceptual and computational aspects
of time-sequential combat games [22], [23], [24].
Since our work here may be considered to be an elaboration upon and
extension of Kawara's fire support differential game [16], it seems appropriate
to review the major results of his work and to relate our work here to it.
In [16] Kawara considers combat between two heterogeneous forces, each composed
of infantry (the primary weapon system) and artillery (the supporting weapon
system). The problem is to determine the optimal strategy for each side in
distributing the fire of its supporting weapon system over enemy target types
according to the criterion of the force ratio of infantry at the end of the
prescribed duration attack scenario. Kawara concludes that each side s optimal
strategy for the distribution of its supporting weapon system's fire is to
always concentrate all fire on the enemy's supporting weapon system (counter-
battery fire) during the early stages of battle (if the total prescribed length
of battle is long enough) and then later to switch to concentration of all fire
on the enemy's infantry. He states that this switching time "does not depend
on the current strength of either side but only on the effectivenesses of
both sides' supporting units" (p. 951 of [16]). Moreover, an optimal strategy
has the property of always requiring concentration of supporting fires on
enemy infantry during the final stages of battle.
It is indeed curious that Kawara, who develops an analytic result which
actually shows that the optimal strategy of one of the players (the defender)
may depend upon force levels (see the expression for T" and its plot in
Figure 4 of [16]), concludes that the switching time at which one changes
his optimal strategy from concentration of all one's supporting fires on the
*
Kawara does not determine the optimality of extremal strategies developed for
his problem (see [28] and also [25]).
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enemy's supporting units to concentration upon the enemy's primary ones
(i.e. infantry) is independent of force levels but depends only on the
effectivenesses of both sides' supporting weapon systems [16]. Kawara's
results as presented in his Figure 4 clearly show that the optimal strategy
of one of the players (for his data set, the defender) is to switch (in forward
time) from concentrating all supporting fires upon the enemy's supporting
weapons (i.e. counter-battery fire in the case of artillery) to concentrating
all fires upon his primary system at an earlier (forwards) time in those cases
in which the player is going to lose all units of his supporting system before
a critical time (here t = - T
1
) . We have seen that such a result occurs
in the solution to the tactical air-war game considered in Appendix B (see
Figure 3 of Appendix B) . Such behavior was apparently first noted by Professor
Rufus Isaacs (see pp. 101-104 of [15]), whose discussion is more thorough than
Kawara's [16] but who presents essentially none of the mathematical details
in [15].
Thus, Kawara concludes in [16] that optimal strategies do not depend
upon force levels. As noted above, this is only true provided that the appro-
priate side's (in Kawara's numerical example, the defender) supporting weapon
system is not reduced to a zero force level before a critical time. Let us
assume, therefore, that neither side's supporting weapon system can be reduced
to a zero force level. Then the optimal strategies are independent of force
levels, and this property of the optimal strategies is readily seen to be a
function of the criterion functional for a given set of combat attrition
equations. We will show that Kawara considered in [16] the only type of objec-
tive function (i.e. criterion functional) which yields optimal strategies
Initial force levels and the known length of battle may be sufficient to
guarantee this for a given set (or range of values of) Lanchester attrition-
rate coefficients.
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independent of force levels. Kawara s criterion functional is a special case
of a more general one considered in this appendix. The adoption of a criterion
functional of this general form will be shown to be a necessary (as well as
sufficient) condition for the optimal strategies to be independent of force
levels. In other words, Kawara essentially used the only objective function
that yields the above results reported by him. For any other form of criterion
functional, the (forwards) time at which a side changes from concentration of
all fire on the enemy's supporting units to his primary ones in following an
optimal strategy will depend upon the force levels.
The importance to military analysis of the above property of the optimal
strategies is obvious. If the statement [16] that optimal strategies do not
depend on current force levels is taken literally, it means that one may use
an open loop strategy, i.e. u = u(t;t
f
.,x_), for optimal results. This means
that it is optimal to use a pre-programmed attack strategy (not depending upon
(intelligence estimates of) initial force levels or even the dynamic evolution
of combat). This is, indeed, a dangerous conclusion to reach, since it may
mean the difference, for example, between a successful and an unsuccessful
amphibious landing. Moreover, this conclusion is not even true for the problem
considered by Kawara, and a minor variation in Kawara' s model leads to optimal
strategies which depend directly upon the force levels.
Thus, our purpose in this appendix is to clarify the dependence of the
structure of the optimal strategies (at least for the case in which neither
As noted above, this is provided that the appropriate side's (in Kawara' s case,
the defender) supporting weapon system is not reduced to a zero force level.
As qualified in the previous footnote, this is only true provided that the
appropriate side's (in Kawara 's case, the defender) supporting weapon system
is not reduced to a zero force level. We have assumed above that this condition
is satisfied.
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side's supporting units are all lost) upon model form (i.e. the combination
of the type of attrition equations and the nature of the criterion functional).
We then consider a slight variation in Kawara's problem for which the structure
of the optimal strategy of one of the combatants is significantly different
than that in the original problem [16]: the optimal strategy of one combatant
depends directly upon the enemy's force levels and is no longer to always con-
centrate all fire on either the enemy's primary or supporting weapon system.
Furthermore, we will show that an optimal strategy in which a side divides
the fire of its supporting weapon system between the enemy's primary (infantry)
and supporting systems can only occur when the enemy's infantry has some
effectiveness (in the sense of a non-zero Lanchester attrition-rate coefficient)
against his infantry. The optimal strategy of one side to sometimes split its
fire is very similar to that which occurs in a one-sided (optimal control)
problem previously considered by us [26] (see also [27]) for the optimal dis-
tribution of fire by a homogeneous force in combat against homogeneous forces.
In [26] the enemy consisted of two weapon system types, each of which undergoes
attrition at a rate proportional to the product of the numbers of firers and
targets (referred to, for convenience, as "linear-law" attrition). In fact,
this previous work of ours [26] was the motivation for our examination here
of other attrition structures in Kawara's problem.
2. On the Relationship Between the Objective Function and the Structure of
the Optimal Fire-Support Strategies in Kawara's Fire Support Differential
Game .
In the recent paper [16] Kawara considered the attack of heterogeneous
X forces against the static defense of heterogeneous Y forces. Both the
X and Y forces are composed of two types of units: primary units (or infantry)
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and fire support units (or artillery). The X infantry (denoted as X..
)
launches an attack against the Y infantry (denoted as Y ). We consider
that phase of the attack which may be called the "approach to contact." This
is the time from the initiation of the advance of the X.. forces towards the
Y defensive position until the X forces actually make contact with the
enemy infantry. It is assumed that this time is fixed and known to both
sides and that infantry fire has negligible effectiveness against the enemy's
infantry during this time. During this time the fire support units remain
stationary, and each unit has the capability to deliver either "point-fire"
counterbattery fire against enemy artillery or "area fire" against the enemy's
infantry.
It is the objective of each side to attain the most favorable force
ratio of infantry possible at the end of the "approach to contact" at which
time the force separation between the opposing infantries is zero and artillery
fires must be lifted from the enemy's infantry in order not to also kill friendly
forces. Thus, the decision problem facing each commander is to determine the
"best" distribution of artillery fire over time between enemy infantry and
enemy artillery in order to maximize the quotient of friendly infantry (numerical)
strength divided by enemy infantry strength at the end of the approach to con-
tact. This situation is shown diagrammatically in Figure 1. The reader is
referred to Kawara's paper [16] for further details of the model's development.
It should be pointed out that this model also applies to the case of an amphib-




Figure 1. Diagram of Kawara's Fire Support
Differential Game.
































x.(t=0) = x° and y.(t=0) = y° for i = 1,2,i 1 ^x J 1
and
x ,x ,y 1 ,y2
^0 (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
2. u ,v s» l (Strategic Variable Inequality Constraints),
where
x (t) is the number of X infantry (i.e. X ) at time t,
x (t) is the number of X artillery (i.e. X ) at time t,
similarly for y (t) and y (t),
a. is a constant (Lanchester) attrition-rate coefficient
l
(reflecting the effectiveness of Y fire against X.),
similarly for b.,
l
and u(v) is the fraction of X(Y) artillery fire directed at opposing
infantry forces.
It should be noted that for T < +°° it follows that we will always have
x (t),y
1
(t) > 0. Thus, the only state variable inequality constraints (SVIC's)
that must be considered are x9>y 9 ^ 0.
Kawara's results and conclusions [16] have been discussed in Section 1
above. Let us assume that neither side's artillery is reduced to a zero
force level . Then we will show that Kawara in his paper [16] chose only the
possible type of criterion functional which yields optimal fire support
strategies that are independent of force levels. We will do this for two
cases: (1) only infantry considered in the criterion functional and (2) all
force types considered in the criterion functional.
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Before we develop the above results, it is convenient to first establish
some preliminary results regarding the characterization of an optimal fire
support strategy (i.e. the basic necessary conditions of optimality) . For
x ,x_,y ,y„ > 0, the Hamiltonian is given by [7]
H ( t
'^»yjR,'^ u ' v ) = "p lvalxiy 2 " P 2^ 1_V ^ a 2y 2 " q lub ly iX 2 " cl2^ 1_U ^ b 2X 2' ^
where we have adopted the following correspondences between state and adjoint
variables
:
state variable dual variable
x. p . for i = 1,2,
l l
y. q. for i = 1,2.





























,y ,y > 0, the extremal strategic-variable pair, denoted
as (u*,v*), is determined by the max-min principle . Hence, we consider








Thus, for y ,y > 0, we have
1 for S (t) > 0,
u*(t) = < (8)
for S (t) < 0,
D-ll
where the u-switching function, S (t), is defined by
u
S (t) = b 1 (-q 1 (t))y 1 (t) - b.(-q,(t)). (9)
u l v Hl vw;;r w "2 K H 2
Similarly, for x ,x~ > 0, we have
1 for S (t) > 0,
v*(t) = I (10)(t
J
\ for S (t) < 0,
where the v-switching function, S (t), is defined by
S
v
(t) = alPl (t) Xl (t) - a 2p 2
(t). (11)
For future purposes, it is convenient to note the following:
p (t)x (t) = constant, (12)
and
q (t)y (t) = constant. (13)
Both these results are readily established by direct computation using the
state and adjoint equations. Using the boundary conditions for the adjoint
variables at t = t
f ,
one can easily show that the constant in (12) is
positive, while that in (13) is negative. Since an extremal trajectory is
synthesized by working backwards from the end at t
f
= T, it is convenient
to introduce the backwards time t defined by
t = T - t. (14)




= (l-v*)b„S (t) - b.a 1 p 1 (t)x.(t), (15)dT v- ,-"2~v*** irr' i
ft
By an extremal trajectory we mean a path on which the necessary conditions of


















From (15) and (16), it should be noted that —- < and 3—^ < for alldT ClT
t ^ 0. Thus, we see that singular subarcs (see [6], [12], [25]) are impossible
for the problem (1).
2.1. Case in Which Only Infantry Considered in Criterion Functional .
We will first examine the case in which only infantry is considered
in the criterion functional. It is convenient to re-write the problem (1)
as follows:
maximize minimize G(x.. (T) ,y (T) ) , (17)
U V
with stopping rule: t
f


























x.(t=0) = x. and y.(=0) = y. for i = 1,2,
x 1 1 J ±
and
x ,x ,y ,y ^0 (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
^ u,v ^ 1 (Strategic Variable Inequality Constraints).
It seems appropriate to discuss the mathematical properties of the
criterion functional (terminal payoff) G(x (T) ,y (T)) . We assume that the
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first partial derivative of G(x ,y ) exists for each of its arguments. Let











We now state and prove Theorem 1. It should be noted that all the
results developed in the previous section are independent of the criterion
functional. Let t, denote the "backwards time" of the first switch in fire
distribution as determined by the optimal fire distribution strategies. Then,
we have
THEOREM 1: Assume that xo2' y , and T are such that
x (T) > and y 2 (T)
> 0. Then t is independent
of x (T) and y (T) if and only if
k




where F(u) is a dif ferentiable, strictly increasing
function of u for u ^ and k > 0.
PROOF: (a) Since x (T) ,y (T) > and we assume that x (T) ,y (T) > 0,



































so that the differential equations for the switching functions are
dS




= (l-u*)a S (t) + a b iyi (T)^-^— , (26)dr x * " '"2 u 2VV 'ay^T) '
with initial conditions






.^(1) ^g- > 0. (28)
dS
It should be noted that, for example, (l-v*)S (t) ^ so that -— < and
dS
dT
— < for all t ^ 0.
dr





for t € [0,t ]. (29)
* v*( =1




(x) - -b^T) j^fc - b^TO^ t, (30)
V*> "WT > i^k + a 2Vi (T) ^Jn T - (31)













































where t, is the solution to the linear equation S (t=t.) = 0.
1 u 1
(c) By (32), (33), and (34), it is clear that t is independent of
x (T) and y (T) if and only if
*1< T > ix^T
-y (T )
SG
~ = k = constant > 0. (35)
It is convenient to write (35) as
!<*> tajk +^ wfk o. (36)
The solution to the above linear first order partial differential equation
(P.D.E.) is readily obtained by the method of characteristics (see p. 247 of
[9]). Thus, G(x (T),y CT)) is constant for
dx^T) dy^T)




















where F(u) is a dif ferentiable , strictly increasing function of u for
u £ and k > 0. Thus, Theorem 1 is proved. Q.E.D.
Let t„ denote the "backwards time" of the second switch in fire
distribution as determined by the optimal fire distribution strategies. With-
u v
out loss of generality we may assume that t.. < T- . Then we have
u*(t) =
v*(t) = 1
for t € (z t t ] (39)
We now state and prove Theorem 2
THEOREM 2: Assume that x° y° and T are such that x (T) >
and y„(T) > 0. Then i is independent of x (T)
and y (T) if and only if t is.
u v
PROOF: (a) Let us first observe that the assumption t.. < t, implies that
S (t'O =0 and S (t=t 1 ) > 0.u 1 v 1
(b) Using (39) and (33) with t = T
1
,





1 1 8x (T) a b 1
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(c) The "backwards time" of the second switch in fire distribution
*






whence follows Theorem 2. Q.E.
P
.




, y , and T are such that x (T) >
and y 9 (T) > 0. Then the optimal fire support strate-
gies for (17) through (19) are independent of force












where F(u) is a dif ferentiable , strictly increasing
function of u for u ^ and k > 0.
dS dS
It should be noted that the fact that - < and -; < for all
dx dx
x ^ guarantees that there will be no further switches in fire distribution
as determined by the optimal fire distribution strategies.
2.2. Cas e in Which All Force Types Considered in Criterion Functional .
In this case we will show that there is no "simple" criterion func-
tional such that optimal fire support strategies are independent of force
levels. We consider the foj lowing differential game:
: u v
It should be noted that the assumption that x < x, implies that x_ > X-
.
This follows from the facts (readily obtained from (32) and (33)) that x
x = b /(a b_k) and x = a k/ (a b ) . The condition x. < x then yields
x, < l//a b whence x > x via (40).
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maximize minimize P(x (T) ,x (T)




with stopping rule and battle dynamics given by (18) and (19), respectively.
We assume that the first partial derivative of P(x ,x_,y ,y ) with respect
to each of its arguments exists and that






(T) "' 3y 2
(T)
We now state and prove Theorem 3. Let x .. denote the "backwards time"
of the first switch in fire distribution as determined by the optimal fire
u vdistribution strategies. Furthermore, we have that x.. = minimum (x ,x ),
where x. is the solution to the Linear equation S (x=x ) = and similarly
v
for x.. Then, we have
THEOREM 3: Assume that x"
,
y° and T are such that x (T) >
and y 9 (T) > 0. Then both x and x are independent
of X]L (T), x 2
(T), Y
1



























K = k/k with k > k >
R(A,B) has the following properties:
(1) the first partial derivative with respect to
each argument exists,
(2) for A,B ^
(a) it is strictly increasing in A for
fixed B,
(b) it is strictly increasing in B for
fixed A.
D-19
PROOF: (a) Since x (T)
, y
1
(T) > and we assume that x (T) ,y (T) > 0,





(t=T) = ra- " °- i2fr-I) = WJv * °















(t) » constant = y^T) J^~(fj K °-
(44)
As before, the differential equations for the switching functions S (t) and
u




(T"0) =-biy](T ) y+b2 -,
and (45)
S (t=0) = a x (T) -^j— - a
v
vl





It should be recalled that we have shown above that < and <
dr dx
for all t ^ 0.
(b) Our interest is in determining the class of criterion functionals
for which the optimal fire support strategies are force level independent.
We are also considering the special case in which x_, y_, and T are such
that x (T),y (T) > 0. From (a) we see that S (t=0) ^ yields that
u*(t) =0 for £. t t> T and similarly for v*. Thus, for the purposes of
our investigation here the cases in which S (t=0) £ and/or S (x=0) s-°
u v
are not germane, since they are cases in which independence of strategies from
force levels is not a meaningful property to study. Therefore, let us consider




and S (t=0) > 0,
v
(46)
where the above are given by (45)
.
(c) By (46) and the extremal strategies (8) and (JO) , we again have






l7l (T) B^rTy + b 2 8y^y- b 2a i X l (T) *^T) T •
S
y
(T) - alXl (T) 3-^-
- a
2 ^y + a^y^T) ^y I
(47)
(48)
It is convenient to write the above as
S
u
(T) = V ^)"i b l










































(d) By (49) we see that t is independent of x (T) , x 9 (V), y (T)















= constant > (51)
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Writing the above as
VT) S^n + kyi (T) ^m ' k F^ 3^75) = °- (52)





















(e) Similarly, t is independent of terminal force level values
if and only if P also satisfies the following first order P.D.E.
x
i
(T)^ + kVT) ^)-^^y"°- (56)
where k > 0. Since (in order that both t and t be independent of
force levels) P must satisfy both (52) and (56), the latter condition
places the following requirement on any F which satisfies (53)
el







where we have used facts like y, (T) t=t- = -a — + b — . (This latter
1 dy
1
( I ) da db
condition is merely a consequnece of the chain rule, of partial differentia-
tion.) In obtaining (57) we have made use of the fact that F = F(a,b,c)
with c = x„(T) also satisfies (53).
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where A = „ , B = be , and K = k/k. Using (54), (55) and the fact
b
K_1
that c - x_(T), we readily obtain the expressions for A and B in the
statement of Theorem 3.
9P
(g) It is obvious that A,B ^ 0. The conditions that r t=^t > anddx (T)
3P 3R 3R





must be such that - /m v < and ——-y=r- < 0. This implies that we must have
3y-i
(T) 3y 9 (T)
3A -




Theorem 3 is complete. Q.E.D.
Comment : An equivalent form of Theorem 3 is obtained by reversing the order
of solving equations (52) and (56)
.
As before, let t„ denote the "backwards time" of the second switch in
fire distribution as determined by the optimal fire distribution strategies.
Without loss of generality we may assume that T- < T and then (39) holds.
We now state and prove Theorem 4.
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THEOREM: 4: Assume that x
, y , and T are such that
x,,(T) > and y ? (T) > and assume that t < t .
Let I be independent of x (T) , x (T)
, y (T)
,
and y 2 (T). Then T is independent of x (T) , x (T)
,





























S(A,B) has the following properties:
(1) the first partial derivative with respect to
each argument exists,
(2) for A,B £
(a) it is strictly increasing in A for
fixed B,
(b) it is strictly increasing in B for
fixed A.
PROOF: (a) Let us first observe that the assumption T-. < t implies that
S (t-t,) = and S (t=t ) > 0. Furthermore, we have that
























( T- Tl ) , a2
biyi (I)^ (x-t,) - ^Vl (T) l^T) (T"V2 - W
(c) The. "backwards time" of tbe. second switch in fire distribution
*
t„ is the positive root of S (t-t.) = so that
2 v 1
3P

























(d) The assumption that t.. is independent of x (T) , x (T)
, y (T) ,
and y ? (T) yields that it is both necessary and sufficient that P be given
by (53). Rewriting (60) as

























1 QT; 3x, (T)
(61)
Now, x will be independent of x (T) , x_(T), y, (T) , and y ? (T) if and
only if the right hand side of (()!) is a constant. Hence,
c u v
As noted in the proof of Theorem 2, it may be shown that t. < x implies that
x„ > i .
.
The proof follows that given previously above.
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~ b^ ^m + k \ ^oo - °» (62)
where k is a constant (which may be determined by (6])). Since P must
be given by (53), F must also then satisfy
ka — + kb — - —- = 0, (63)da 3b b x 3c
3P 3F
where we have used facts like x (T) p—r- = ka —- , etc. In obtaining
(63) we have made use. of the fact that F = F(a,b,c) with c = x (T) also















where A = a/b
,
B = be , and K = k/k. The expression for A and B
given in the statement of Theorem 4 are readily obtained via (54) and (55).
3P




tttt- > yield that x-r > a^d ^r > 0. It should be noted that3x (T) y oA 3B
3P 3P




3Aimplies that we must have r—r- < 0. Hence, we must have K > 0, and the
proof of Theorem 4 is complete. Q.E.D .
Considering Theorem 3 and Theorem 4, we may conclude that there is no
"simple" criterion functional which explicitly contains x. (T) , x_ (T)
, y 1 (T)
,
and y 9 (T) and yields optimal fire support strategies for (41), (18), and
(19) which are independent of force levels. We state this as Corollary 2.
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COROLLARY 2: Assume that x , y_ , and T are such that x (T) >
and y ? (T) > 0. Then if the criterion functional (41)
depends explicitly on x (T) , x (T) , y,(T), and y
2
(T),
there is no "simple" form for this criterion functional
such that the optimal fire support strategies (for the
differential game defined by (41), (18), and (19)) are
independent of force levels.
3 . Another Model for Optimal Fire-Support Allocation
.
In this section we will consider a slightly different version of
Kawara's model. We will see, moreover, that the structure of the optimal
fire support strategy for the attacker has a fundamentally different form
than that for the previous problem (1) (i.e. Kawara's original problem [16]):
the attacker must sometimes split his fire between the defender's primary and
supporting units in order to "avoid overkill." Furthermore, the nature of
this split depends upon the allocation of the defender's supporting fires.
Let us again consider the attack of heterogeneous X forces against
the static defense of heterogeneous Y forces. Each side is composed of
primary units (or infantry) and fire support units (or artillery) . The X
infantry (denoted as X ) launches an attack against the position held by
the Y infantry (denoted as Y ). Again, we will consider only the "approach
to contact" phase of the battle. This phase is the time from the initiation
of the advance of the X forces towards the Y defensive position until
the X.. forces actually make contact with the enemy infantry. It is assumed
that this time is fixed and known to both sides.
The X forces begin their advance against the Y forces from a
distance and move towards the Y position using "cover and concealment."
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The objective of the X forces during the "approach to contact" is to
close with the enemy position as rapidly as possible. Accordingly, small
arms fire by the X forces is held at a minimum or firing is done "on the
move" to facilitate their rapid movement. It is not unreasonable, therefore,
to assume that the effectiveness of X ' s fire "on the move" is negligible
against Y . We assume, however, that the defensive Y fire causes attri-
tion to the advancing X forces at a rate proportional to the product of
the numbers of firers and targets. Two possible justifications of this are
as follows: because of the movement (and intermittent concealment) of the
X
1
forces and the distance involved, the Y defenders either (1) fire into
a constant (but moving) area without precise knowledge of the consequences
of their fire or (2) when they do aim fire at X
1
targets, the time to acquire
such a target is inversely proportional to the density of X.. forces and much
greater than the time to kill an acquired target. Under each of these cir-
cumstances it is well known that the postulated form of attrition occurs
[6], [31].
During the "approach to contact," the fire support units remain
stationary. Each unit has the capability to deliver counterbattery fire
against enemy artillery or "area fire" against the enemy's infantry. In
other words, we assume that each side's fire support units fire into the
(constant) area containing the enemy's infantry without feedback as to the
destructiveness of this fire. On the other hand, the effectiveness of
counterbattery fire is not symmetric with respect to the two combatants. We
assume that the defender has the capability (for example, through the use of
aerial observers) to sense when an enemy supporting unit has been destroyed
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so that fire may be immediately shifted to a new target and that fire is
uniformly distributed over the survivors. The attacker, however, either
(1) does not have the capability to sense destruction of enemy fire support
units accurately (and hence distributes his fire uniformly over the (constant)
area occupied by the defender's fire support units) or (2) if he does have
adequate fire assessment capability, then target acquisition times (which are
inversely proportional to the density of the enemy's fire support units) are
much larger than the time to destroy an acquired target. This leads to a Y




It is the objective of each side to attain the most favorable infantry
force ratio possible at the end of the "approach to contact" at which time the
force separation between the opposing infantries is zero and artillery fires
must be lifted from the enemy's infantry's position in order not to also kill
friendly forces. Thus, the decision problem facing each side is to determine
the "best" distribution of artillery fire between enemy infantry and artillery
over time in order to maximize the infantry force ratio at the time of contact
between the two infantry forces. This situation is shown diagrammatically in
Figure 2.
Alternatively, we may think that the attacker has massed so much artillery that
X£ targets are always easily acquired by Y2 once an X2 unit has been
destroyed. Moreover, it will be assumed below that the initial X2 force
level is sufficiently ]arge to guarantee that it is never driven to zero.
This assumption is not essential for the structure of X2 ' s optimal fire
support strategy. A similar structural result may be obtained when X2 '
s
attrition is the same form as that for Y2 . We have made the above assumption,
moreover, so that the resultant attrition model is most similar to Kawara's [16'
but yet yields significantly different results for the attacker's fire support
strategy.
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Figure 2. Diagram of Fire Support Differential Game.
The above assumptions lead to the following differential game with an







with stopping rule: t f - T = 0,
subject to:
(battle dynamics)
= -anVl " Va l2 X lY 2'5dt
dx
2












x.(t=0) = x° and y.(t=0) = y° for i - 1,2,
i 1 1 i
and
x ,x ,y ,y ^0 (State Variable Inequality Constraints),
^ u,v ^ 1 (Strategic Variable Inequality Constraints)
,
where all symbols are (essentially) the same as defined above for problem (1).
It should be noted that for T < +°° it follows that we will always
have x (t), y- (t) , and y~(t) > 0. Thus, the only state variable inequality
constraint (SVIC) that must be considered is x~ ^ 0. However, let us further
assume that the force level of the attacker's artillery is never reduce d to
zero . In other words, we consider the special case in which x_ and T are
such that x (T) > 0.
4 . Characterization of Optimal Fire Distribution Strategies for the Suppor t ing
Weapon Systems.
It should be clear that in (64) above we have a - ,a
1
_
,a_ ,b ,b_ > 0.
Although the results of A.Friedman [10] concerning existence of value do not
apply to the original version (64) of our fire-support differential game, they
do apply to a suitably modified version. If we were to consider a version of
dx
this problem with -— = -(l-v)a y„ + r„ where r„ > 0, then it may be showndt III I
(see pp. 210-230 of [10]) that this "modified" differential game has value and
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that a saddle point exists in pure strategies (see pp. 234-235 of [10]).
We will now develop the basic necessary conditions of optimality for (64)
.
For x ,x ,y ,y > 0, the Hamiltonian for (64) is given by
H ( t 'X>X.>H>a,> u ' v )
= " P
l












where we have adopted the following correspondence between state and adjoint
variables
:





q . for i = 1,2.




















- auVl + u^x^






(T) = - —j~^
(yp
3y
= V*a ]2X lP l
+ ( l"v*) a
2
P 2










It should be recalled (see Appendix A) that H, pjt) , and qjt) are con-
tinuous functions of time except at manifolds of discontinuity of both U* and
V* (see Section 4.3 below).
When x ,x ,y ,y > 0, the extremal strategic-variable pair, denoted
as (u*,v*), is determined by the max-min princi ple. Hence, we consider
t
We use the term extremal to denote a trajectory on which the necessary condi-





maximize minimize H(t ,x^, jr, d^, g^, u, v) ,
0£u&l 0s>v^l
so that
/ 1 for S (t) > 0,
u*(t) =
' for S (t) < 0,






















( for S (t) < 0,




















ffW =all^ y l (t) >0 ' (75)
'
=
-a.(l-u*)S (t) - a b a v. (76)
dt 2 V ' u v ' 2 1T1
We must further investigate the possibility of singular subarcs (see
[26] or Chapter 8 of [7]). Let us first show that it is impossible to have
f
a V-singular subarc . In other words, v*(t) must be or 1 almost
We use capital letters to denote (closed-loop) strategies (e.g. U = U(t,x^,yJ)
and corresponding lower case letters to denote the outcomes of strategies,
or strategic variables (e.g. u(t) = U(t,x,yJ).
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everywhere in time. The impossibility of a V-singular subarc is established
dS
by showing that 77- > for all t £ [0,T]. It is clear that
(l-u*)S (t) £- for all t € [0,T]. (77)
f
X
lConsidering (75) and the fact that q (T)y (T) = - —7 < 0, we see that
q, (t)y
1
(t) < for all t £ [0,T], whence follows " the assertion via (76).
3H
It is possible, however, to have a U-singular subarc on which -~— =
(or, equivalently, S (t) = 0) for a finite interval of time. There are two
cases to be considered: (1) v* = 1 and (2) v* = 0.
4.1. U-Singular Subarc on Which V* = 1 .











































Considering (71), the requirement that — = yields the first condition fordu










Considering (78) and (80), the requirement that Tz(y~) = ° on a singular
3H
subarc on which -7— = for a finite interval of time yields the second condi -
3u














On a subarc on which the first and second conditions for a singular subarc
hold we additionally require that -7—7- (—-
") =0 so that (79) yields thedt du





Checking the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition [17], [18] »—{—z(^~) } ^ 0,
we find that on a subarc on which (80) and (81) hold we have
f














for v* = 1.
4.2. U-Singular Subarc on Which V* = 0.
































so that the first and second conditions for a U-singular subarc with V* =
are, respectively, (81) and









This is a necessary condition for optimality. R. Isaacs [15] gives an
equivalent condition (see [13]).
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It should be noted (see [13]) that the above singular surface exists in
x - p^ space. It is convenient to write
— =
—
K~ + ^~{-S (t)} for v* = 0.y a b f v
2 11 1 anb 1 x 1



















S b lP2x 2
. (89)
It is readily checked that, the generalized Legendre-Clebsch condition is
satisfied.
4.3. Discontinuity of Adjoint Variables Across Manifold of Discontinuity of
Both U* and V* .
It is convenient to introduce the backwards time t defined by
x = T - t. (90)
From (82) and (88), we see that u*(t) must change, in general, discontin-
uously from b
2
/(b ,+b ) to b / (b +b
2
) (l-q^/ (p^) ) whenever v*(t)
changes from 1 to 0. Let us consider the totality of trajectories on which
this happens. The locus of points in the t,x^- space for such simultaneous
switches is then a manifold of discontinuity of both U* and V* . Across such
a manifold the adjoint variables need not be continuous (see Appendix A).
Let t - x (x,y) denote the backwards time at which v*(t) changes
v v
from 1 to 0. For future purposes, it will be convenient to consider a
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simultaneous switch with u* changing from the singular control b
?
/(b +b_)
to 1. Then the manifold of discontinuity of both U* and V* is given by




G (vJ - aubiyi - a 12b 2y 2 = 0.
Across the manifold of discontinuity, we have
T, +, T, - s 3F 3G




T, +. T, -. 3F 3G
q (t ) = q (t ) - p -r a —- ,
** v ** v 3y 3y
«<) H<V + p If + " If •












qi (<)> - (-q^V) + P ^ + aaubl , (93)
(-q
2(<» - (-q 2 (r)) +P^-oa 12b 2 , (94)
H(t*) = H(t~) + p. (95)
Considering (71) and (73), it is readily shown that
VTV> = 0{all (bl)2yi + a12<W + p(Vl W] ' b 2y 2 3^ »' (%)
and
3t 3t
S (t ) = -p(a19 x 1 —
V
- - a 9
---). (97)
v v 12 1 3x 2 3x
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Recalling that u*(0 = b„/(b.+b_), u*(t+ ) = 1, v*(t ) = 1, and v*(t+ ) - 0,V I 1 I V V V
3t
we may substitute (92) through (94) into (95) to obtain for a^x^y, —- +
8x
v















l 3^ " a 2y 2 3^ " b i y i X2 3^
(98)
Then we may write













2y 2 3y7> v












-a (b )^y x (a x a =—)a
11 1 1 2 12 1 3x 2 3x
S (x ) = — ± . (100)
v v 3x 3t 3t
[1-a x y ay b y x -z—
J
* 11 1 1 3x 2 2 3x 112 3y '
5 • Synthesis of _Extrema l Strategic-Variable Fair .
By the synthesis of the extremal strategic variable pair we mean the
explicit determination (using the basic necessary conditions of optimality)
of the time history of the extremal strategic variable pair (u*,v*) from
initial to terminal time (see [15] and also [26 ]
-
[2H 1 ) . The basic idea is
to trace extremals backwards from the terminal manifold (where boundary con-
ditions for the adjoint variables arc known) in such a way to guarantee the
f
It should be kept in mind that, for example, u*(t) = U*(t,x^, yj
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satisfaction of the initial conditions. Thus, it is convenient to introduce
the backwards time t defined by (90)
.
5.1. Extremal Trans itions in Strategic Variables .
It seems appropriate to examine what are the possible transitions (or
changes) in each strategic variable as we work backwards from the end (i.e.
8S
as t increases). It has been shown above that —— < for all x i. [0,T].dx
Considering the boundary conditions (66) and (67) for the adjoint variables,
it follows that S (t=0) > 0. Thus
1 for * t 2* t
,
v
v*(t) = I (101)
' for t < t.
V
It will be convenient to refer to that phase of the planning horizon during
which v*(t) = as V-Phase I (i.e. 0^t<T-x) and to that during
v
which v*(t) = 1 as V-Phase II.
Extremal transitions in u* for increasing t as shown in Figure 3.
Thus, this figure shows what changes we might expect to observe in u* as
we follow an extremal backwards from the end of the planning horizon at t =
dS fx^
During V-Phase II when v* = 1, dx
b^/V > 0. When u* = 0, then —








lyra12b 2y 2 ) With Su (T=0)V















Durin8 both Phases > the singulardx
subarc may be exited with either u* =0 or u* = 1. Once u* becomes 0,









for v* = 0,
for v* = 1
Figure 3. Extremal Transitions in u* for Increasing x
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5.2. Extremal Synthesis for x* < x ./ . u v







-j > 0, (102)
y
i
so that by (70) we have
u*(t) - 1 for £ x £> x
,
(103)
where t is the smallest zero of the equation S (t=t ) = 0. If the U-
u u u
singular subarc is reached in V-Phase II (see Section 4.1. above), then let
us denote the backwards switching time at which u* changes from 1 to
b_/(b-+b„) as t*. Clearly, it is necessary that T* < T for this singular
2 1 2 u uv
subarc to appear in the solution. Thus, in general, there are two cases to
be considered:
(1) t* < x
,U V
and (2) T* £ T .
U V
In the report at hand, we will only consider the former case with the latter
following along the same general lines of development. Let us therefore,
f f f f u uassume that a , a
? ,
a , b . , b
? ,
x , x
, y , and y are such that
T* < t . We will give numerical results for this case below.
-xl v



























_^ # However, S (x) may change sign when —p < -7— . The U-
a . b n u a n -. d .
y 2
11 1 y 2
11 1
singular subarc occurs when both S (x=x*) = and a in b-y, = a 10b y atuu 11 11 12 II



















is given, then S
u
(t=tJ) - and a by = a
£
b y may be combined
to yield the value of y required in order to reach the U-singular subarc
f f f f
b
l







(Other results are given below in Table I.) We denote the corresponding ratio
p f f*of y to y * as
1 *
When S (t=t ) = with a^^y.. < a nnb_y , it follows that t iiu u 11 1 1 12 2 2 u
the smallest root of the transcendental equation
































> where r = y n /y . This latter result is useful
9 r 12
in proving the following:
THEOREM 5: Assume that T > T*. Then
,
U*(T) l on any extremal
V u
f f







PROOF: The proof is by contradiction. Let r = y,/y 9 -
f






In other words, we can find t such that S (t=t ) =
u u u
S (t) > for s. x < t ,
u u
(106)








—7-I + e with e > and such that x < T ,
3x 3t
Then it may be shown that -r— > 0. In particular -
—
<3r 9r




* > 0. This
y 2
1 u* = 1(c) Observe that \ . n for ^ x £ x <t so that y, /y„ =
< v* = 1 u v















since then t (r=r) > T*. It has been shown above that -— > for y, /v. >
u u ._ dT 12dS
a 1?b /(a b ). Thus, (107) implies that
-
— (t=t ) > 0, and hence
= S (t=t ) > S (t) for t C (t -6 ,t ). (108)
u u u u u
This last statement (108) is a contradiction to (106) , and the theorem is
proved. Q.E.D .
Other results are obtained in a similar fashion.
5.2.2. Field Construction .
T, • , ! f f f ftor a given set of terminal values x.. , x , y , and y„ an extremal
may be traced backwards from the terminal manifold by a backwards integration
of the state and adjoint equations combined with (70) and (72) (also (82) or
(88)). By varying these terminal values the entire field of extremals (see
p. 128 of [7]) may be obtained.
The various types of extremals that may occur in the field of extremals
are shown in Figure 4. This figure is representative of all our numerical
results for t* < x (see Section 5.2.3 below). Pertinent information con-
u v




















































Table I. Extremal Trajectories for Fire Support
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T is the smallest positive root of
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with the following bounds established:
for auy[ > b^:
1 „ * 1
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nlx (t) = x
l













































































/(b 1+b 2 )
for T £. T ^ T
V*(T) =1 u V
* II
where t is determined in 1. On P„„ we have
u SI



































* 11 f * )(t-t ) z— exp[8x (x-x )] ( ,
u (ex^) 2 2 u '
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Table I. (cont.) - 3
3. P : < for s t s. t with
u*(x) = 1
V*(T) = 1 y
2 "y 2
T is the smallest positive root of S (t=t ) = 0, where S (t)
v r v v v




It has been shown that S (t) > for s. t & t . The solutions to the
u v




for T S. T £ T
V u
We have that S (t) < for t > t and that
v v
dS
-~- (t) m b.,yis (t) +
di / 2 v
7i
j (a 11b 1 y 1 (T)-a 12b 2y^).
Also, on P.. we have
Al
dx
























= y 2 >
dp
j~- -«11y1p1 with Pi<T-V = V
dp
2 v





















We have not been able to develop solutions in terms of "elementary" functions
to the equations for x , p , p 2> q., and q^.
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Again, an upper bound on x is given by a „/(a„b ). It has been shown
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6. P.„: < for t & t £ tA2
' v*(t) =0




7. P~! <! for t s. t s. xA3
' V*(T) =
Results are similar to those for P A , above in 4.Al
u*(t) =b
2
/(b1+b 2 ).(l-q2y 2 /(p 2x 2 )) -u* ,
8. P_„:
<
for t £ t £ x
' v*(t) =
As usual, we have that S (t) < for t > t . In order for a
v v
*
U-singular subarc to be possible for t £ t the following condition must
*-
hold at x = x
v
I t























l * / *% v*
— = ugb^^ with y1 (T-tv) = y x ,
dy


















with Pi (t=tv )
= Pl ,
dP 2 * V*
— = -bl y iqi






l * , K v*
— =




























A further discussion of the continuity of the adjoint variables is to be found
in Section 5.2.4. below.




for ^ t s x with —r <
v*(T) =1 U y 2
y-j
V





























— < T < T ,
f u u
where the determination of x is given in 1. We also have that
u
x (r..) < x (r~) for r < r (x and x held constant). The solutions
to the state and adjoint equations are the same as those for P _ given above.
Let S (t=t ) = S , p. (t=t ) = p., , etc.
v u v 1 u 1
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Table I. (cont.) - 7
u , u*(t) =
10
'
PR9 : \ for T S. T ^ TB2
' v*(t) =1
y













is the smallest positive root of S (t=t ) = 0, where































































f U f / Na10y. b_x-(x-T )





) - -^ [e
2 2 u






































































' v*(t) = 1
for T riT & T & TSL v





S (t) = S + a by

























Again, an upper bound on t is given by a _/(a b ). It may be shown that
S (t) < for all x > t . Also, on P we have
U bL D j
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, P* : {B4
« v*(T) =
Table I. (cont.) - 9
u*(t) =
12. for t* s. t
V
It may be shown that S (t) < and S (x ) < for all t > t . Also,
u v v
on P„. we have
B4
. . v* r v* * i
^(t) m x± exp{a
11y1
(t-t^)}














v*,r. 2 v* * -, ,. 2 t v* 2 v*x
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/ \ 7 V*/r, 2 V*, *.i2 . 2 , v* 2 v*y 2 (T)
= / y 2 /{I
- T x2 (x-Tv)} for — (x 2 ) = a 2y 2 ,
v* 2 v* . o * 2 , v* 9 v*
(y 2 ~ it (X2 } )/c°S <C < T- TV >+D) for 2 <x2 > < a 2y 2 '
A = ^/^ 9 2a 2 V*where —J (x ) z - -g— y2 ,
Table I. (cont.) - 10
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with q 2 (T=Tv )
= q 2
,
We have not been able to develop solutions in terms of "elementary" functions
to the equations for p and q .
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B
I v*(t) =
Results are similar to those for P_. above in 12.
B4
! , u*(t) =
"• PB5
: £° r T
SL
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Results are similar to those for P_. above in 12,
B4
T
/ u*(t) = 1
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5.2.3. Numerical Examples .
In this section the results of some numerical computations are presented
and discussed. A computer program which calculates the information given in
Table I was developed in FORTRAN for the IBM 360 computer. I would like to
thank CPT Jeffrey L. Ellis, U.S. Army for his efforts on this project. This
computer program outputs a plot representing the field of extremals (see
Figures 5 and 6 below). The closed-form analytic results presented in Table I
are used whenever possible. Approximate numerical solutions to transcendental
*
equations (for the determination of, for example, t
,
t
, etc.) are developed
by the well-known Newton-Raphson method. In those cases for which closed-form
solutions are not available to the state and adjoint equations, a standard
fourth order Runge-Kutta numerical integration method is used. A time step,
At, was used in these numerical integrations which yielded agreement to the
fifth place to the right of the decimal place in test cases in which the approx-
imate numerical solution could be compared with the exact solution.
Parameter sets for the numerical examples considered in this report are
given in Table II. In the problem (64) at hand we may consider time to be an
additional state variable so that the state space in five dimensional, i.e.
the state variables are t, x- , x~, y , and y„. Thus, unfortunately, we
cannot graphically depict the field of extremal trajectories, since this would
involve curves in a five-dimensional space.
Table II. Parameter Sets Used to Generate Numerical




Set fll fl2 f2 \ b_2 !l f2 12
1 0.003 0.006 0.01 0.004 0.005 4.0 8.0 8.964
2 0.003 0.006 0.01 0.004 0.005 4.0 8.0 11.597
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The most illuminating plot for gaining insight into the structure of the
optimal fire support strategies for (64) is that of extremal trajectories in
terms of Y-i^Yn versus backwards time, x. This is shown for parameter set
1 in Figure 5. The corresponding strategic variable values for X and Y
(i.e. u* and v*) along each extremal are also given. Other plots have
been considered, but they provide little, if any, additional insight.
The most significant features of the field of extremals shown in Figure
5 are the two U-singular "surfaces": there is one in x,y - p,q space in
V-phase I and one in y-space in V-phase II. In each phase, X uses the
strategy U = 1 above the singular "surface" and the strategy U = below it.
Similar to our discussion in [27], the singular surfaces are present in the
field of optimal trajectories so that the X artillery avoids "overkilling"





Thus, the rate of destruction of Y per unit of X artillery decreases over
time as the Y force level decreases (see [26] and [27]).
Results for parameter set 2 are shown in Figure 6. There is a void
(see p. 169 and also p. 187 of [15]) in the field of extremals. This is because
•k
in backwards time at the end x of the U-singular subarc in V-phase II, we
v
ft+
would have u (x ) (as given in Figure 3) equal to 1.054 if the adjoint
o V
•k





Backwards Time, t (minutes)
Figure 5. Plot of — versus Backwards Time, t, for
y 2
Field of Extremals for Parameter Set 1.
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60
Backwards Time, t (minutes)
(t=T)
Figure 6. Void in Field of Extremals Shown in Plot of
—
y 2
versus Backwards Time, t, for Parameter Set 2.
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THEOREM 6: There can be no U-singular subarc beginning in
backwards time at t with a.-b.y. = a 10b_y for
v 11 r 1 12 2 2
b
lP 2
(V x2 + b2VT>2 * °"
When a U-singular subarc begins at T with
a by = a „b y , there is no discontinuity in the
adjoint variables at t = t (i.e. a = in (99)).
PROOF: Immediate by (89) and (99). Q.E.D ,
Additionally, Theorem 7 gives the extremal transitions in X's strategy possible
from the U-singular surface in V-phase II as we work backwards from x . Thus,
since b n p„(x )x~ < b~(-q~(x ))y~ for parameter set 2, a void would exist in12 v 2 2 2 v 2
the field of extremals if the adjoint variables were continuous at x .
THEOREM 7: Assume that there is no discontinuity in the adjoint
variables at x = x with a^b.y. = a nob.y_. Then
v 11 1 1 12 2 2








))y 2 , then we can only
have u*(x) = for x € (x ,x +6) where 6 > 0,
II. if b p (x )x ^ D 2(~ cl2^ Tv^ y 2 , then We ° an haVG
I (a) 0,
u*(x) = I (b) (l-q
2y 2/(p 2x 2 )) •b 2 /(b 1+b 2 )
(c) 1,
for x t (x ,x +6) where 6 >
v v
*_
PROOF: (a) When we are on the singular surface in V-phase II at x = x
then by (84) and (85) and the continuity of the dual variables we have
S (x=x
+
) = S (x=x
+






(b1+b 2 )p2x 2y 2{u*(<)- b1+b 2
1 "











(b) Considering a Taylor series expansion about T = x
, we have by
+ *+
the above for x ^ x = x
v v
(t-x ) 2 00
S
u
(x) —2*-S (r), (110)
where x € (x ,x)























so that 3 5, > such that S (x) < for all x £ (x ,x +5,). Thus, we
1 u v v 1
can always have u* = as we work backwards in V-phase I from the U-singular
subarc in V-phase II.
(d) Now let blP2 (x*)x2 ^ b 2 (-q 2
(x*))y
2
. By (88) , the U-singular
control in V-phase I u = (1-q y ? /(p ?x )) *b /(b +b ? ) £ 1. Thus, the
*+ ° ° *+.
U-singular subarc is possible. When u*(x ) = 1, then S (x=x ) ^ by
v u v
(109). When inequality holds, it follows that 3 6 > such that S (x) >
* * *











The same analysis as used in the proof of Theorem 7 applies on a
U-sintular subarc in V-phase I when v* = . As long as (89) holds, one
has three options similar to those of part II of Theorem 7.
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5.2.4. Filling in a Void .
We have emphasized that H, p(t) , and q(t) are continuous function
of time except at manifolds of discontinuity of both U* and V* (see Section
4.3 above). From Theorem 7 it follows that a void must exist in the field of
* *
extremals when these functions are continuous and b p (x )x < b (-q (x ))y 9 «
At t , moreover, v* changes (as we progress backwards in time) from 1 to
and u* from b_/(b
1
+b 9 ) to a different value. Thus, we have a manifold of
discontinuity of both U* and V*. Moreover, considering results given above,
it is readily shown that u*(x) remains for increasing t (i.e. backwards
time) equal to zero once it changes to zero. Then from Theorems 6 and 7 it
*- *_
follows that for b.p~(x )x_ < b (-q„(x ))y~ the dual variables must be12 v 2 2 2 v y 2
* I*discontinuous to fill in the void, and we must have u*(x) = 1 for x < x < x
v u
Furthermore, considering Figure 6 and considerations "in the large," the mani-
fold of discontinuity must lie on the V-transition surface.













v*(x ) = 1 l v*(x ) = 0.
(Ill)
9x 3x
v A vandIt remains to determine the function x (x,y) of (91) so that
v ** *~ 3x dy^
may be computed, and the jumps in H, p, and q subsequently determined (see
(92) through (95)). It should be clear that it is impossible to explicitly
determine x (x,y). However, by computation of five points on the V-transition
surface, the desired partial derivatives may be estimated by using linear
approximations to the appropriate directional derivatives and solving a system
of four linear equations in four unknowns. For parameter set 2 (as the reference
case), this yielded the following estimates
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3x 3t










It is, therefore, convenient to re-write the jump conditions across




(V =P1 (V' p 2 (Tv> = p 2 (V - p ae
+
8xW =W " P 3yf- aailbr (113)
q 2 (V =q 2 (V " P ay^ +aa l2b 2'
where p and a are related by (98). In this case the jumps (99) and (100)
in the switching functions simplify to
S



































S (t ) = 5 L-r~













Since v*(t ) = 0, we must have S (t ) ^ so that (112) and (115)
'ield that a £ 0. It should be clear that a = if and only if H, £, and
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* *+
q are continuous at t . For o > 0, the condition that u*(t ) = 1 yields* v v






where S (t ) is given by (114). Although it cannot in general be guaranteed
that (116) will always hold when a void in the field of extremals such as that
shown in Figure 6 exists, it should be clear that it must if the problem (64)
is to have a solution. The author conjectures that this is true. It is readily
shown that when (116) holds, we have
JL I O JL I JL i
S (t ) > 0, S (t ) < 0, and S (t ) < 0. (117)
U V U V V V
As we have shown in our past work (see Appendix A) , the appropriate
value for a is determined by "considerations in the large": the structure
of the entire field of extremals determines the value of this parameter. In
I*
Figure 7, we let t denote the backwards time at which the U-singular subarc
I*
is entered in V-Phase I. Corresponding to t is a*, which yields the
first and second conditions (86) and (87) (with u* £ 1) for a U-singular
T A *
subarc with V* = at t > t . For < o < a*, one uses u*(x) = 1 for
u v
*+ I I
x < t < t and then u*(x) = for x > t . For a > o* , the U-switching
v u u
function S (t) never changes sign so that u*(t) = 1 for all T > t . Thus,
by manipulation of a, one may fill in the void in the field of extremals in
V-Phase I. The resulting field of extremals is shown in Figure 7.
5.2.4. The Case of Negligible Y Small Arms Effectiveness .
It seems appropriate to consider what happens to the solution to the
problem at hand as the (relative) effectiveness of Y (small arms) fire
becomes negligible, i.e. as a.. -> 0. Let us consider (either) Figure 5 (or
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40 20
Backwards Time, t (minutes)
T=
(t=T)
Figure 7. Filled-In Void in Field of Extremals
For Parameter Set 2.
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Figure 7). The U-singular "surface" in V-Phase II has equation y /y„ =
a..b /(a^b ). Thus, as a _ _ > with the other parameters being held con-
stant, this singular "surface" appears higher and higher on the y,ly~ axis
in Figure 5. In the limit, the singular surface does not appear in the finite
part of the plane. Thus, we have shown that an optimal strategy in which a
side divides the fire of its supporting weapon system between the enemy's
primary (infantry) and supporting systems can only occur when the enemy's
infantry has some effectiveness (in the sense of a non-zero Lanchester attri-
tion-rate coefficient) against his infantry.
6 . Discussion .
In this section we discuss what we have learned about the dependence
of the structure of optimal fire-support strategies upon model form from our
examination of the problems at hand. We studied two aspects in this appendix:
(1) the relationship between the criterion functional and the structure of
optimal fire-support strategies in Kawara's fire support differential game
[16], and (2) a different attrition form for casualties produced by the
attacker's fire support.
We first examined for what class of criterion functionals (terminal
payoff only) the optimal fire-support strategies (at least for the case in which
neither side's supporting units are all lost) are independent of force levels.
This was done for the same combat dynamics as considered by Kawara [16]. In
this examination, we introduced a general approach for such determinations.
We determined the most general form of terminal payoff with only infantries
considered in the criterion functional for which optimal fire-support strate-
gies are independent (as qualified above) of force levels. The criterion
functional considered by Kawara [16] is a special case of this general form
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of terminal payoff. Thus, Kawara [16] essentially used the only objective
function that yields the results reported by him. For any other form of
terminal payoff, the (forwards) time at which a side changes from concentra-
tion of all fire on the enemy's supporting units (counter-battery fire) to
his primary ones in following an optimal strategy will depend upon the force
levels. Finally, we showed that there is no "simple" type of terminal payoff
which includes both sides' infantry and artillery and yields optimal fire-
support strategies which are independent of force levels.
We finally examined the dependence of optimal fire-support strategies
upon the form of the combat attrition model by considering slightly different
combat dynamics than those considered by Kawara [16]: we let the attacker's
(X's) artillery produce "linear-law" attrition against both the defender's
artillery as well as infantry. As contrasted with the optimal strategies in
Kawara' s problem [16] of always concentrating all artillery fire on first enemy
artillery and then enemy infantry, for our problem (64) the optimal strategy
of one combatant (X) depends directly on the enemy's force levels and is no
longer to always concentrate all fire on either the enemy's primary or secondary
weapon system. The solution to (64) is characterized by the presence of singu-
lar surfaces (a different one for each V-Phase of battle). When the system
state reaches one of these surfaces, X follows a strategy of dividing his
artillery fire between enemy infantry and artillery in order to avoid "overkill."
Another aspect of optimal fire-support strategies not present in Kawara 's
problem [16] which occurs in the problem at hand (64) is that X's strategy
depends upon the optimal fire-support strategy of Y. In fact, X must react
instantaneously to changes in Y's optimal strategy.
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It should be pointed out that the development of even a partial
solution to (64) involved solution phenomena not previously encountered in a
Lanchester-type differential game: the adjoint (or dual) variables are
discontinuous on a manifold of discontinuity of both U* and V*. This
manifold of discontinuity exists for a certain range of parameter values in
the solution to the problem at hand. Furthermore, there is a military inter-
pretation to this manifold of discontinuity: if Y„ concentrates fire on
X_ and X» on Y , then when Y changes to concentrating all fire on
X.. , X must re-evaluate the worth of a Y 9 unit because it now has a direct
influence on the payoff. Such discontinuities in the dual variables are unique
to differential games (see Appendix A)
.
It should also be pointed out that the presence of the singular surfaces
in the solution to (64) is independent of the form of the criterion functional
(here terminal payoff) and depends only on the combat dynamics. For purposes
of comparison, we considered the same payoff as considered by Kawara [16].
We also showed that the singular surfaces can only be present in the solution
when the defender's infantry (Y ) has a (non-zero) casualty producing capa-
bility against X .
The problem (64) considered in this appendix has certain similarities
to the "War of Attrition and Attack: Second Version" considered by R. Issacs
(see pp. 330-335 of [15]). We have, however, developed a much more complete
solution to the problem at hand. Although this problem (64) possesses some
similarities to the Lanchester-type optimal control problem studied by us in
[26], its solution has turned out to be much more complex. It should be pointed
t The reader should recall that these represent the marginal values of force types,
3Vi.e. p
?
(t) = -r~r- where V = V(t,x,yJ denotes the value of the differential
Z. OA
,y \ L )
game (see [10], [15]).
D-69
out, however, that our developments in this appendix have been materially
aided by intuition developed through the study of the simpler, one-sided
problem (see [27] for a further discussion).
As a result of our investigation here, we hope that a better under-
standing of optimal fire-support strategies has been developed. Our work here
shows that the nature of the functional form of the artillery casualty rates
essentially determines the most significant aspects of the structure of
optimal strategies. Thus, examination of these optimization problems shows
the importance of determining the appropriate (Lanchester-type) model of
combat dynamics.
Finally, it should be pointed out that computational work on the problem
(64) has not been completed at the time of this report. Due to the theoretical
complexities (especially the discontinuity in the dual variables), student
project work on numerical examples was not completed. We would propose to
ONR the completion of this computational work as a future research task.
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